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BANKRUPTCY AND REORGANIZATION: A
SURVEY OF CHANGES*
EDWARD H. LEVI AND JAMES WM. MOOREt
N THIS and a subsequent article the objectives, history, and present
status of the English, Canadian, and United States structures dealing
with the liquidation and rehabilitation of financially embarrassed
debtors will be examined. The objectives of a sound legal structure in this
field are: equitable distribution of the debtor's estate among the creditors;
rehabilitation of the debtor; and protection of credit. When the legal
structure has been well designed to effect these objectives an economic
crisis is not apt to result in appreciable change. This is borne out by the
English and Canadian experience. But where the objectives have not
been substantially attained the financial strain of an economic crisis will
cause experiments in legislation. Such legislation is often temporary in
character, hastily conceived, and none too successful. Such has been the
experience in the United States.
In England, legislation dealing with the individual and corporate (busi-
ness entities in general are embraced within the term "corporate") debtor
is the product of slow, gradual growth. The early objectives were protec-
tion of credit by processes that would reach the fraudulent debtor, but
these were gradually broadened to embrace the objectives enumerated
above. Economic crises have not produced sudden change in the legisla-
tion. Thus the provisions in the Companies Act of 1929 for liquidation and
reorganization of companies remain substantially as under the Act of
19o8, and the bases of the present English Bankruptcy Act of 1914 are
* This and an article to be subsequently printed in this Review were prepared by the authors
as reporters to the International Academy of Comparative Law, The Hague, on the liquida-
tion and reorganization legislation in England, Canada, and the United States. The report was
read at the Academy's 1937 session.
t Assistant Professors of Law, University of Chicago Law School.
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those of the Act of 1883.Y Careful provisions in the Act of 1914, dealing
with discharge and offenses, protect the commercial community from the
dishonest and the wastrel debtor. Official supervision results in honest
and careful administration and the attainment of the policy of the act.
Rehabilitation of the debtor is provided by an allowance to him for the
support of himself and his family. So far as applicable the same theories
have been applied to the liquidation and rehabilitation of companies, ap-
parently with reasonable success.
In Canada, with the exception of special legislation dealing with farm-
ers, legislation that deals with the rehabilitation and liquidation of debtors
is not a product of economic crises. It is the natural evolution in law of a
country emerging from provincialism into national stature. Its aim is to
bring within its provisions an estate as soon as that estate becomes in-
solvent, liquidate it under governmental and creditor control, discharge
the honest debtor, and protect the community from the dishonest and in-
efficient debtor. In general, corporations are subject to the Bankruptcy
Act. This is a departure from the English Act; it is similar to the American
Act. With leave of court insolvent corporations may be liquidated under
the Winding-up Act, which is quite analogous to the winding-up provi-
sions of the English Companies Act. Until recently the more important
aspects of rehabilitation or reorganization of companies have not been sub-
ject to court supervision. The Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act,
1933, and the amendments of 1934 to the Dominion Companies Act do not
substantially change corporate reorganization as theretofore practiced.
They do, however, give the court more control over the reorganization.
Their analogue may be found in the sections dealing with arrangements
and reconstructions of the English Companies Act.
In the United States, from the beginning of our nation there has been a
conflict between those who support federal rights and those who support
state rights. The federal power extends to the "subject of bankruptcies"
and dearly is broad enough to embrace the field of liquidation and rehabili-
tation covered by English and Canadian legislation. But its use has met
with determined opposition. Until 1898 we had had three bankruptcy
SWhen Joseph Chamberlain introduced his bill which was to become the Bankruptcy Act
of r883 he admonished Parliament that in framing legislation two things must be kept in mind:
"Those were, firstly, in the honest administration of bankrupt estates, with a view to the fair
and speedy distribution of the assets among the creditors, whose property they were; and,
in the second place, their object should be following the idea that prevention was better
than cure, to do something to improve the general tone of commercial morality, to promote
honest trade, and to lessen the number of failures." Senate Doc. No. 65, 72d Cong. ist Sess.,
57 (1932). These have been fairly attained in the English bankruptcy legislation and ad-
ministration.
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acts: the Act of i8oo, repealed in 18o3; the Act of 1841, repealed in 1843;
and the Act of 1867, repealed in 1878. Many believed that state insolv-
ency laws afforded sufficient relief. It was only in times of financial
stringency that the federal power over the "subject of bankruptcies" was
invoked, and when the crisis had passed the use of the federal power was
discontinued. As a result state insolvency laws became accepted, although
in what respect they differ from legislation dealing with the "subject of
bankruptcies" has never been and can never be definitely stated, for any
insolvency law is essentially within the power granted to the federal gov-
ernment. Overlapping and confusion did not result to any real degree un-
til after 1898, because until then federal bankruptcy legislation had been
short-lived. In that year the present bankruptcy act was passed as a re-
sult of economic stringency, but unlike prior experiences, the Act of 1898,
subject of course to change, seems to have become a part of our perma-
nent national law. Prior to the last economic crisis major amendments to
the Act were made in 19o3, 19o6, 1gIo, 1917, 1922, and 1926; basically
the Act remained the same.
In the United States prior to the last depression, generally it was possi-
ble to effect an arrangement, as distinguished from liquidation, in three
ways: (i) through a voluntary contract entered into between the cred-
itors and the debtor; (2) through formal bankruptcy, either using the
composition section of the bankruptcy act, or employing the bankruptcy
sale as a means of purchasing the old assets of the debtor, with the cred-
itors and sometimes the debtor himself becoming the purchaser in a new
arrangement; (3) through an equity receivership obtained on a creditor's
bill, usually consolidated with foreclosure proceedings, terminating in a
judicial sale at which the creditors and sometimes the debtor became the
purchasers under a new arrangement. Of these three methods, the equity
receivership was the most feasible and was most frequently employed.
Dissenting creditors could not be bound by a voluntary arrangement in
the usual case. The voluntary arrangement was therefore not frequently
used save where it was desired to change the rights of stockholders who
could be bound by a change in the corporate charter perfected through
merger, consolidation, sale of corporate assets or amendment. Creditors
who held their claims under a trust indenture, with provisions which al-
lowed majority action to be binding on dissenters, might effect a volun-
tary arrangement binding on all creditors of the class, but this was a later
development and was not frequently employed. Composition proceed-
ings in bankruptcy could not affect secured creditors, and by tradition
the consideration given creditors had to be cash or notes and could not
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consist of other types of security. The bankruptcy sale carried with it the
odium which adheres to the word bankruptcy, and the bankruptcy court
was unwilling to permit the proceedings to continue in bankruptcy while
an arrangement was being worked out and the debtor's business was being
conducted for the benefit of creditors.
The equity receivership was an adaptation of the ancient right of a
creditor with judgment and execution returned unsatisfied to gain the aid
of equity in reaching the assets of the debtor. In arrangement practice,
the receivership was most often actually obtained by the debtor, who pro-
cured a friendly creditor to file a bill, to which the debtor consented. Be
cause the creditor often had no judgment with execution returned unsatis-
fied, the propriety of equity jurisdiction was doubtful, but it was felt that
the debtor's consent waived the defect. By procuring a friendly creditor
with a claim in excess of $3,000, who was a citizen of a different state than
the debtor, it was possible to have the receivership in the federal courts
which were thought more competent to deal with the difficult business
problems of arrangements. This caused opposition from the friends of the
state courts who charged that the federal equity proceedings were collu-
sive. The federal equity receivership, as opposed to the state court equity
receivership, nevertheless developed as the primary means of reorganiza-
tion. Its development was at first most pronounced in the reorganization
of utilities. The federal courts developed doctrines whereby the business
of the debtor could be continued under the protection of the court while
an arrangement was being worked out. The business could be rehabili-
tated during this period by the receiver borrowing money on receiver's
certificates, which in the case of utilities would constitute prior liens. The
United States Supreme Court also developed a doctrine whereby the ar-
rangement under which creditors purchased at the judicial sale had to
maintain to some degree the priorities between secured creditors, unse-
cured creditors, and stockholders, upon pain of having the arrangement
later upset by a dissenter charging a fraudulent conveyance.
The equity receivership, however, was inadequate to meet the needs of
reorganizers. In the first place dissenting creditors had to be paid their
share of the proceeds of the sale in cash. This made reorganization diffi-
cult and at the same time was not much protection to dissenters whose
cash share was usually less than the cash value of the new securities which
would be offered to them under the plan of arrangement. In the second
place, the equity receivership usually required ancillary receiverships in
every other federal district where the debtor had property. In the third
place, the court's control over the plan of arrangement was tenuous be-
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cause in theory the court could not control the plan of reorganization save
as it was thought to effect the fairness of the sale. There was, therefore,
little assurance that the arrangement plan was a fair plan. In the fourth
place, since the court's jurisdiction over the plan was tenuous, it was not
clear that dissenters might not attack the plan at some later date on the
theory that it was a fraudulent conveyance in that stockholders were al-
lowed to participate before creditors were paid in full, or because the prior-
ities between creditors had not been properly maintained. In the fifth
place, the receiver appointed was often friendly to the debtor, since the
debtor controlled the appointment of a receiver to a large measure by the
consent receivership device. A friendly receiver would not discover fraud-
ulent practices perpetrated by the debtor, and would not rout inefficient
management. Finally, the equity receivership allowed various financial
interests to play a paramount role in the reorganization without much
court supervision. The result was that the representatives of creditors
were often representatives of financial houses whose basic interests were
opposed to the creditors.
The inadequacies of the equity receivership as a means of arrangement
were such that agitation for arrangement reform was continuous in the
years before the depression. The depression heightened the agitation
mainly because it became increasingly difficult to borrow money to pay dis-
senters their share in cash; and because during the depression there were
more dissenters. In addition the tempers of creditors with defaulted secu-
rities became increasingly short during the depression with the result that
charges of fraud and collusion were prevalent. This threatened the very
foundation of the equity receivership which was based, it was said, on the
collusive consent of the debtor. The depression also increased the opposi-
tion to the practice of appointing friendly receivers who did not discover
the fraud that angry creditors were sure existed. The result was that ar-
rangement practice in the United States went through a complete trans-
formation during the depression, ahd many of the reforms previously
urged were adopted.
The changes in arrangement practices may be divided into changes in
state court decisions, and changes under state and federal statutes. The
state courts during the depression rapidly dosed the gap which existed
between the equity receivership in the state court and that in the federal
court, with the result that some state courts at the end of the depression
exercised more control over the plan of reorganization than had the federal
courts prior to the depression. The state courts came to this position after
many of them had imposed, during the worst days of the depression, what
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was in effect a judicial moratoria over the collection of debts. State mora-
toria legislation was also widespread. A great deal of it was later held un-
constitutional but even the unconstitutional statutes helped debtors over
the worst periods of the depression. Debtor relief statutes were followed
by creditor relief statutes in many states. These statutes provided means
whereby a stated majority of creditors could bind the remaining creditors
to an arrangement plan under the jurisdiction of the court. Most fre-
quently, however, these statutes were only applicable to businesses tra-
ditionally under the control of the state because affected with a public
interest, such as banks or insurance companies. New York and Michigan
went further. Not only did they regulate arrangements between the hold-
ers of real estate securities, but they attempted to regulate the control of
the selection of creditor-representatives by financial interests.
The greatest development during the depression was the addition of
four reorganization sections to the bankruptcy act. Section 74 was de-
signed to regulate arrangements proposed by unincorporated debtors;
section 75 set forth a structure of arrangements for farmers; section 77 and
section 77B, the former applying to railroad reorganizations, and the lat-
ter to corporate debtors generally, combined the experience of the equity
receiverships and the bankruptcy tradition for the most complete arrange-
ments act yet had in the United States. All of these acts gave the court
supervision over the plan of reorganization, and all of them allowed a stat-
ed majority of creditors to bind other creditors to a plan, and thus elimi-
nated the need for cash payment to dissenters. These acts, however, did
not fully adopt the reforms that had been urged. Section 77, aside from a
somewhat different provision in section 75, was the only section which
made the appointment of a trustee mandatory and set up qualifications
as to who might be trustee in an effort to avoid the evils of the friendly re-
ceiver. The control which these acts gave the courts over financial houses
promoting the reorganization for their own ends was too tenuous. They
did, however, increase the jurisdiction of the court and eliminated the evil
of widespread ancillary receiverships; and they protected the reorganized
company from the attacks of dissenters. Of the four acts, section 74 was
the most inadequate since secured debts could not be reduced but only
extended under it. All of the acts required that the debtor be either in-
solvent in the bankruptcy sense, or unable to pay debts as they matured.
Sections 77 and 77B were the only sections which allowed creditors to file
an involuntary petition for reorganization against the debtor, and as re-
quirements for the petition they preserved the acts of bankruptcy unless
it could be shown that a bankruptcy proceeding or equity receivership was
pending.
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While the reforms accomplished during the depression were a step for-
ward, they were of necessity directed at those defects in the old system
which made reorganization impossible during depression times; such as
the necessity of cash payment to dissenters. They were deficient in not
broadening the court's control over the business agencies which really
control reorganization such as the house of issue, the underwriter, the
trustee under the indenture, and the paying agent for the debtor. New
legislation now pending in the federal congress will do much to remedy this
defect. The attempt of much of the pending legislation to place secured
claims beyond the reach of the reorganization plan, however, seems eco-
nomically unsound, and it may be doubted whether the pending legisla-
tion will have sufficient control over the debtor's capital structure before
the stage of bankruptcy or an inability to pay debts as they mature has
arrived. The simplification of the capital structure of corporations and
the ability to perfect readjustments prior to insolvency, in either the bank-
ruptcy or the equity sense, seem to be the main requirements of effective
arrangement legislation in the United States.
Lastly, it may be pointed out that legislation dealing with the liquida-
tion and rehabilitation of embarrassed debtors is essentially bankruptcy
legislation. The debtor is often designated otherwise than as a bankrupt,
sometimes merely as a debtor, at other times as an insolvent or assignor.
Such escapes have served a useful purpose in avoiding the stigma which
the word "bankruptcy" connotes, but it must be clearly understood that
the subject of bankruptcies properly embraces any and all relations of
debtor and creditor which substantially affect or may affect insolvency or
liquidation; in other words it embraces the equitable distribution of the
debtor's estate among the creditors, the rehabilitation of the debtor, and
the protection of credit. Equitable distribution is effected when the cred-
itors are protected from overreaching on the part of the debtor and pro-
tected from like tactics by each other. The individual debtor is rehabili-
tated when he is accorded sufficient allowances or exemptions to tide him
over during the bankruptcy proceeding and is given a discharge from his
prior obligations. The corporate debtor is rehabilitated when a new and
adequate credit structure is worked out either for the old debtor corpora-
tion or for a new company which succeeds to the old debtor's estate. Cred-
it is protected when fraudulent practices on the part of a debtor or creditor
are made penal; when the dishonest, the reckless and the wastrel debtor
are refused a discharge; and when the power is used to prevent unsound
and dishonest credit practices. In the United States the latter power could
justify such regulation of the sale of securities and of the security ex-
changes as Congress, beginning in 1933, has enacted under its powers over
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interstate commerce and the mails. It would support legislation regulat-
ing the duties and functions of trustees under corporate indentures, and
committees for security holders in any kind of debt arrangement. It could
be used to require all institutions which may or do materially affect the
credit structure, to become federally incorporated for the purposes of sub-
jecting them to uniform accounting practices and honest and legitimate
credit dealings.
ENGLISH HISTORY AND EXPERIENCE 2
There are three general classes of statutes that must be consulted to get
a complete picture of liquidation in England: the Deeds of Arrangement
Act,. 1914, the Bankruptcy Act, 1914, and the Companies Act of 1929, all
as amended. The Deeds of Arrangement Act and the Bankruptcy Act
govern liquidation of persons not subject to the Companies Act, nor spe-
cial liquidation acts. 3 The Deeds of Arrangement Act provides for some-
thing in the nature of an out-of-court composition or extension, the Bank-
ruptcy Act provides for ordinary bankruptcy liquidation and composi-
tions or extensions as a part of bankruptcy. The Companies Act governs
liquidation and reorganization of registered companies, certain unregis-
tered companies, and companies incorporated outside Great Britain carry-
ing on business within Great Britain.
A distinguished commentator has made this observation: "Finality will
2 Source material: i Halsbury's Statutes of England 567 et seq. (1929) for bankruptcy and
insolvency statutes, and the continuation volumes, and for discussion thereof to 2 Halsbury's
Laws of England z el seq. (2d ed. 193); 2 Halsbury's Statutes of England 874 et seq. (1929),
which deals with arrangements and reconstructions, and winding up of companies under the
Companies Act of 1929, and continuation volumes, and for discussion thereof to 5 Halsbury's
Laws of England 547 el seq. (2d ed. 1931); Williams' Bankruptcy Practice (4th ed. 1932);
Stable, Bankruptcy Law and Practice of England, 5 Journal National Association of Referees
in Bankruptcy 82 (i93); Donovan Report, 71st Cong. 3 d Sess. 17o et seq. (1931); Levinthal,
Early History of English Bankruptcy, 67 U. of Pa. L. Rev. i (ig9'), 8 Jour. Natl. Assn. of
Referees in Bankruptcy 104 (x934); History of Legislation in Bankruptcy, X2 Law J. 229
(1877).
3 Debtor under Deeds of Arrangement Act means "debtor subject to the English Bank-
ruptcy Acts." 2 Halsbury's Laws of England, 432 n. (2d ed. 193).
§ I (2) of the Bankruptcy Act provides: ". . . . the expression 'a debtor,' unless the con-
text otherwise implies, includes any person, whether a British subject or not, who at the time
when any act of bankruptcy was done or suffered by him-
(a) was personally present in England; or
(b) ordinarily resided or had a place of residence in England; or
(c) was carrying on business in England, personally, or by means of an agent or manager; or
(d) was a member of a firm or partnership which carried on a business in England."
Section 126 excludes any registered corporation, partnership or association or company.
The Act does apply to limited partnerships, § 127. Estates of deceased persons dying insolvent
may be administered under the Act, § 130.
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never be reached in any branch of law, but it seems reasonably certain
that until an age is reached when the habits of mankind have materially
altered, the Bankruptcy Law in England has arrived at a point where de-
velopment in matters of principle has come to an end. The existing system
is in substance the same system which was first introduced by the late Mr.
Joseph Chamberlain and which was embodied in the Bankruptcy Act of
1883." 4 This observation can properly be extended to cover deeds of ar-
rangement and the liquidation of c6mpanies. The last economic crisis
produced no basic change. Due to the enactment of such laws as the Na-
tional Health Insurance Act, Old Age Pensions Act, and the Cotton Spin-
ning Industry Act, sections dealing with the trustee's title (Bankruptcy
Act) and priorities (both the Bankruptcy Act and the Companies Act)
were amended. Amendments were in aid of the policy underlying those
laws. The trustee was not to take title to a pension or insurance policy
which a debtor had obtained under such laws; and in the liquidation of a
contributory, payments to funds established by such acts should have a
certain priority, essentially that of other governmental levies and taxes.5
THE MdETHODS OF LIQUIDATION
DEEDS OF ARRANGEMENT
Because of the stigma attached to bankruptcy and because adjudica-
tion in bankruptcy carries with it a disqualification to hold a number of
public offices, a debtor will generally avail himself of the Deeds of Ar-
rangement Act, if he feels that he can make an adjustment with a major-
ity of his creditors. Under this Act a debtor ("debtor" does not include a
company registered under the Companies Act) may make an assignment
to a trustee (a) for his creditors generally, or (b) for any three or more of
his creditors. The deed to be valid must be registered with the Registrar of
Bills of Sale within a short specified time. If the deed of arrangement is
for the creditors generally, it becomes void unless within a specified time
(which is usually twenty-one days after the registration) it has received
the assent of a majority in number and value of the creditors of the debt-
or.6 The registration is an act of bankruptcy which may be availed of
within three months, unless it is an assignment for the creditors generally,
in which case a dissenting creditor may only treat it as an act of bank-
ruptcy if he acts within one month from the service of the notice of the
execution of the deed and creditors' assent.
4 Stable, op. cit. supra, note 2, at 114. s See note 8 infra.
6 See Deeds of Arrangement Act, 4 & 5 Geo. 5, C. 47, § 3 (I914). Section 1i (5) provides
that creditors whose debts amount to sums not exceeding ten pounds shall be reckoned in the
majority in value but not in the majority in number.
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A trustee ordinarily must give security, transmit accounts to the Board
of Trade and to creditors. If bankruptcy does not ensue, he proceeds to
liquidate the estate in accordance with the deed of assignment.
LIQUiDATIoN UNDER THE BAN uiuPTcY Act
The Act of 34 and 35 Hen. VIII, c. 4 (1542) is generally said to be the
first English bankruptcy act. A statute, however, enacted as early as
1283, ii Edw. I, Acton Burnel, related to the subject. A merchant was
given summary powers without process of pleading for "execution against
his debtor, both his body, goods, and lands." Subsequent legislation dur-
ing the reign of Edward III, which was directed against the Lombards,
was designed to make debts of one of the group chargeable to all its mem-
bers. 7 But it was not until the sixteenth century when England became a
commercial nation that it became necessary for the English common law
students to think seriously of bankruptcy legislation. Even then and for
many years following, legislation was aimed solely at the fraudulent
debtor. In 1649 a distinction between bankruptcy legislation and insolv-
ency legislation came into the law. Such distinction has been obliterated
in modern English and in the Canadian legislation, but it continues to
plague us in the United States. Here an overlapping occurs between fed-
eral legislation on the subject of bankruptcies and state legislation on the
subject of insolvencies.
The earliest English Bankruptcy Acts were limited in character, and
designed to cure certain specific evils and abuses. New legislation ex-
tended these statutes to cover other similar situations for the protection of
the growing English commerce and credit. It can, therefore, be said that
England has had bankruptcy legislation from 1542 down to the present
time. From 1542 on, some forty acts have been passed on the subject of
bankruptcy. In 1831 England began an experiment with official liquida-
tion. It set up a separate bankruptcy court and provided for joint admin-
istration by official assignees and assignees chosen by creditors. In 1869
at the insistence of the trading community England went back to creditor
control; the creditors were to choose the trustee, who was to be super-
vised by a committee of inspection chosen by the creditors. Abuses arose
under such a system similar to abuses which we have experienced in this
country, namely, solicitation of proxies by those not vitally interested in
the debtor's estate or interested only to a small extent, with the conse-
quent result that bankruptcy administration became controlled by and
was manipulated for interests adverse to the real class of creditors. In
7See History of Legislation in Bankruptcy, 12 Law Jour. 229 (x877), for suggestion that the
early statutes referred to in the text should properly be considered bankruptcy legislation.
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1883 Joseph Chamberlain's Bankruptcy Act was passed. This act recog-
nized that creditor control had failed and reverted to a system in which
official control plays a large part. The Act of 1914 was essentially a con-
solidation of the Act of 1883, acts amendatory thereto, and other related
acts, and not a revision; its theory and basis remain essentially unaltered."
This long legislative history has been valuable source material for legis-
lation in Canada and the United States. The vital differences between the
English and American bankruptcy legislation are (i) the English provi-
sions governing discharge and offences result in a developed commercial
code of morality designed to give a fair amount of protection to the credit
structure, while such provisions in the United States are in an embryonic
state of development; and (2) liquidation under close official supervision
in England, more or less uncontrolled creditor administration in this coun-
try. In both respects the present Canadian legislation is patterned on the
8 For the present state of the law, see i Haisbury's Statutes of England 567 el seq. (1929)
which states the law of bankruptcy as of the dissolution of the Sixth Parliament of George 5,
May io, 1929, as amended by 20-21 Geo. 5 C. 25 (1930) (An act to confer on third parties
rights against insurers of third-party risks in the event of the insured becoming insolvent,
and in certain other events), and as amended by the Law Reform (Married Women and Tort
Feasors Act, 25-26 Geo. 5 C. 30 § x (d) (1935), which provided that a married woman shall
"be subject to the law relating to bankruptcy and to the enforcement of judgment and orders,
in all respects as if she were afeme sole"), and as amended by Widows', Orphans' and Old
Age Contributory Pensions Act, 26 Geo. 5 & i Edw. 8 c. 33 § 36 (1) (1936) (on bankruptcy of
such a pensioner the pension "shall not pass to any trustee or other person acting on account
of the creditors"), National Health Insurance Act, 26 Geo. 5 & Edw. 8 c. 32 § 68 (1936)
(". .. on the bankruptcy of any person entitled to any benefit, the benefit shall not pass to
any trustee or other person acting on behalf of his creditors"), Old Age Pensions Act, 26
Geo. 5 & r Edw. 8 c. 31 §7 (i) (1936) (" .. . on the bankruptcy of a person entitled to an
old age pension, the pension shall not pass to any trustee or other person acting on behalf of
the creditors."), Clergy Pensions (Widows and Dependents) Measure, 26 Geo. 5 & x Edw. 8
c. 33 § I3 (1936) (similar provision), certain changes in priority of claims were made so that
contributions due by a bankrupt would have a stated priority to effect the policy of the
National Health Insurance Act, 1936, 26 Geo. 5 & i Edw. 8, c. 32 §§ 177,209 (1936) the Widows',
Orphans' and Old Age Contributory Pensions Act, 26 Geo. 5 & i Edw. 8, C. 33 § 13 () (1936)
Cotton Spinning Industry Act, 1936, 26 Geo. 5 & i Edw. 8 C. 21 § 1g. The priority provisions
apply to companies in liquidation.
There are a number of other acts which must be consulted on minor details. Htalsbury lists
the following: Warrants of Attorney Act, 3 Geo. 4, C. 39 (1822); Warrants of Attorney Act,
6 & 7 Vict. c. 66 (1843); Debtors Act, 32 & 33 Vict. c. 62 (1869); Bankruptcy Disqualification
Act, 34 & 35 Vict. c. 50 (I871); Debtors Act, 41 & 42 Vict. C. 54 (1878); Bankruptcy Act,
46 & 47 Vict. C. 52 (1883); Bankruptcy Act, 53 & 54 Vict. C. 71 (18go); Bankruptcy and Deeds
of Arrangement Act, 3 & 4 Geo. 5, c. 34 (1913); Deeds of Arrangement Act, 4 & 5 Geo. 5,
C. 47 (1914); Bankruptcy Act, 4 & 5 Geo. 5, c. 59 (1914); Administration of Justice Act, 15 &
16 Geo. 5, C. 28 (1925), §§ 22, 29; Bankruptcy (Amendment) Act, 16 & 17 Geo. 5, C. 7 (1926);
Economy (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 16 & 17 Geo. 5 c. 9 §§ 13-16, 19 (1926); Bank-
ruptcy Rules, S. R. & 0. 1914, no. 1824 (1915); Deeds of Arrangement Rules, S. R. & 0. 1925,
No. 795 (1925). 1 Haisbury, Statutes of England 567 (1929).
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English. In neither Canada nor the United States are there provisions
corresponding to the English Deeds of Arrangement Act. Provisions in
Canada for an "authorized assignment" are somewhat comparable. They,
like the English Deeds of Arrangement Act, avoid the stigma of bank-
ruptcy, but the Canadian "authorized assignment" is essentially a vol-
untary petition in bankruptcy, since the creditors may not block the as-
signment. To that extent it seems to have been an improvement upon the
English Act.9
The Canadian and the American Acts exempt farmers and wage earn-
ers from involuntary bankruptcy. There is no comparable class protec-
tion in England. It is necessary in all three countries that acts of bank-
ruptcy be committed. But under the Canadian Act, acts of bankruptcy
have lost most of their practical significance for a debtor commits an act
of bankruptcy if he ceases to meet his liabilities as they become due. °
Both the English and Canadian Acts provide for an allowance to the debt-
or,". while in the United States the exemptions vary from state to state,
depending upon the law of the state of the debtor's residence as to what
property is exempt from execution.
In the scheme of distribution the English Act provides that the trustee's
title relates back to the time of the act of bankruptcy on which a receiving
order is made against the debtor, "or, if the bankrupt is proved to have
committed more acts of bankruptcy than one, to have relation back to,
and to commence at, the time of the first of the acts of bankruptcy proved
to have been committed by the bankrupt within three months next pre-
ceding the date of the presentation of the bankruptcy petition. ' 'I2 Persons
dealing bona fide with a debtor and with no notice that he has committed
an act of bankruptcy are protected. In this respect the English Act differs
from both the American and the Canadian, for under the latter acts the
trustee takes title to the estate as of the date of the presentation of the
petition with the right to invalidate certain preferences, liens, and trans-
fers made or taking effect within a specified time (four months under the
9 For discussion of the Canadian Authorized assignment see page 23 infra. The Canadian
Amending Act of 1921 discussed on page 23 infra was more closely patterned upon the
English Deeds of Arrangement Act.
xo See page 20 infra.
"Section 58 of the English Act authorizes the trustee, with the permission of the com-
mittee of inspection to make a reasonable allowance for the support of the bankrupt and his
family, subject to reduction by the court. Slight exemptions are allowed in the English Act.
See Section 38 (2). It exempts the bankrupt's tools, if any, and the necessary wearing ap-
parel and bedding of himself and wife and children to a value not exceeding twenty pounds.
12 Section 37.
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American Act). In attempting an equitable distribution the English Act
has this unique provision: "A person having notice of any act of bank-
ruptcy available against the debtor shall not prove .... for any debt or
liability contracted by the debtor subsequently to the date of his so having
notice."'' 3 Section 36 provides for the postponement of either the hus-
band's or the wife's claims, as the case may be, until other creditors are
paid in full. The Canadian Act has a similar but more extensive provi-
sion; the American Act has nothing analogous.
MACH[INERY AND PROCEDURE FOR LIQUIDATION
In 1831, as we have seen, a separate bankruptcy court was established.
At the present time, however, the county courts outside of London and
its environs have jurisdiction in bankruptcy; in London and its surround-
ings the High Court of Justice has jurisdiction. The Lord Chancellor des-
ignates certain judges of the High Court to sit in bankruptcy. They com-
pose the Divisional Court in Bankruptcy which hears appeals from
county courts. Appeal may with leave be taken from this Divisional
Court to the Court of Appeal, but no further. In the London bankruptcy
district the registrars in bankruptcy are essentially the bankruptcy judges.
From their decisions an appeal goes to the Court of Appeal and with leave
may go to the House of Lords. This will occur only in a rare case.
The Board of Trade plays a most vital part in bankruptcy administra-
tion. This board is one of the departments of the government comparable
to the Department of Commerce in the United States. At its head is the
President of the Board of Trade, a cabinet minister holding his portfolio
subject to the fortunes of politics; but the staff which carries on the work
is permanent, and is made up of civil service appointees. The Inspector
General of Bankruptcy, a permanent official, heads the bankruptcy de-
partment of the Board of Trade. The bankruptcy department discharges
its chief duties through two main divisions, the administrative and the
auditing. The official receivers are part of the administrative division and
make reports to it. This division in turn is able to render much legal and
practical assistance to the official receivers, inasmuch as the chief bank-
ruptcy clerk and his assistants have an extensive and practical knowledge
of bankruptcy administration. Difficult legal questions may be referred
to the Solicitor of the Board of Trade. The auditing division audits
the monthly accounts submitted by the official receivers and the semi-
annual accounts submitted by non-official trustees.
The Board of Trade maintains a bankruptcy estates account with the
' Section 30 (2).
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Bank of England into which, as a practical matter, all funds derived from
bankrupt estates are paid. This achieves centralization of bankruptcy
funds; minimizes misappropriations; and gives the Board of Trade an im-
portant source of revenue.
Official receivers are officers of the court to which they are attached as
well as employees of the Board of Trade. In London and in the large cities
they are paid salaries; elsewhere their remuneration consists of fees. They
investigate the debtor's conduct and affairs by both private and public
examination; make reports relative to the bankrupt's discharge, and in
proper cases apply to the court for an order for prosecution of the bank-
rupt. In "small bankruptcies," hereinafter discussed, the official receiver
liquidates the estate; in other cases he rarely becomes trustee but does
have custody of the property pending the trustee's appointment. He pre-
sides at the first meeting of creditors and through proxies that are quite
generally given him plays a large role in the selection of the trustee.
Small Bankruptcies. A small bankruptcy is one in which the assets are
not likely to exceed £300 in value or where the debts of the bankrupt do
not exceed fifty pounds. These cases are handled summarily by the official
receiver who devotes as much care to the proceeding as if it were an im-
portant one. The conduct and affairs of the debtor are investigated as
minutely as though a big estate were involved. A large bulk of the bank-
ruptcy proceedings come under this head.
Administration of Oth7er Estates. It is not considered good policy to have
the official receiver devote his time to the administration of estates ex-
ceeding in value £300. A non-official trustee is selected by the creditors,
subject, however, to certification by the Board of Trade. The Board will
not certify an incompetent person as trustee and as a result chartered or in-
corporated accountants trained in liquidation are usually elected trustees.
Trustees are subject to supervision by a committee of inspection consisting
of from three to five creditors chosen by the creditors. The trustee must
have the committee's permission in order to do anything of importance,
but usually the committees place a great deal of confidence in the trustee
and their approval is formal.
Compositions. Before or after adjudication, as in the United States, the
debtor may propose a composition or scheme of arrangement. A majority
in number and three-fourths in value of the creditors may make an ac-
ceptance binding upon all the creditors. If an adjudication in bankruptcy
has been made it may be annulled where the composition is accepted.'4
'4 Section 16 (io) provides: "If any facts are proved on proof of which the court would be
required either to refuse, suspend, or attach conditions to the debtor's discharge were he ad-
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Voluntary and Involuntary Bankruptcy. A debtor may file a petition
alleging that he is unable to pay his debts. A receiving order is then made
and an order of adjudication may be made at the same time if the petition
prays such relief. Normally, however, adjudication is not made until after
the first meeting of creditors.
Any creditor or creditors having a liquidated claim for £5o or more may
file a petition alleging that the debtor has committed an act of bankruptcy
within three months. "The act of bankruptcy most frequently alleged is
failure to comply with the bankruptcy notice. In 1928 it was alleged in
78% of the total number of creditor's petitions upon which receiving or-
ders were made. In the preceding years the percentage was slightly high-
er."' s The bankruptcy notice is essentially a collection device. It is a
notice to the debtor to satisfy a judgment that has been obtained against
him within a stated time, usually seven days. The debtor is warned that
failure to comply is an act of bankruptcy. The threat is sufficient in many
cases to secure compliance.
The involuntary petition in bankruptcy is served on the debtor. Upon
the hearing the court may dismiss the petition, make a receiving order
against the debtor, or adjourn. "The average period from the date of
filing the petition to the date of the receiving order, computed from eighty-
five High Court (London) cases, was 69.3 days. Adjournments before the
receiving order are granted on the theory that, until the receiving order is
made, bankruptcy proceedings are a device by which a creditor may col-
lect his debt. If he consents to an adjournment in order that his debtor
may raise funds and pay the debt, an adjournment is proper."' ' In this
respect the English Act is a collection device and is dissimilar to both the
Canadian and the American Acts. After a receiving order is made the
creditors' meeting is held and administration proceeds as outlined above,
depending upon whether it is a small or large bankruptcy case. The first
dividend is supposed to be within four months of the first meeting of
creditors, but as a practical matter dividends are rarely declared within
that period.
Costs of bankruptcy administration in England are high, probably
more so than in the United States. An efficient and honest administra-
tion, however, is secured.
judged bankrupt, the court shall refuse to approve the proposal, unless it provides reasonable
security for the payment of not less than five shillings in the pound [25%] on all the unsecured
debts provable against the debtor's estate." This subdivision is said to account for the un-
commonness of compositions in bankruptcy. Donovan Report, 71st Cong. 3 d Sess. 18i (193r).
Is Donovan Report, 71st Cong. 3d Sess., 184 (193). 16 lb&.
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CRITICISM AND SUM ARY
The stigma of disqualification attaches to bankruptcy. As a conse-
quence England has the Deeds of Arrangement Act which is properly a
subject of bankruptcy. The code of commercial morality protects the
community against both the dishonest and the inefficient trader. This
protection is its chief asset. Protection is due not only to the provisions
of the Act itself but to administration largely under government super-
vision.
England and Wales, to which the Act applies, are small countries and
it might be argued that a machinery for liquidation for such countries
would not prove workable in a country as large as the United States. The
Canadian Act, however, is patterned upon the English Act in this respect
and it appears, as we shall see, to be functioning well.
WINDING Up, LIQUIDATION AND REORGANIZATION OF COiPORATIONS
Liquidation and reorganization of corporations proceed under the Com-
panies Act of I929.'1 This Act governs registered companies, certain un-
registered companies, as a trustees savings bank certified under the Trus-
tees Savings Bank Act (1863), certain partnerships' and associations, and
companies incorporated outside Great Britain but carrying on business
within Great Britain. In summary, the Act governs the great bulk of busi-
ness entities.
WINDING-UP
The winding-up provisions of the Companies Act govern both (I)
liquidation of the company where it is commercially insolvent and (2)
the winding up or dissolution of a company where it is desired to terminate
business or where the company has failed to comply with corporation law,
as making "default .... in delivering the statutory report to the regis-
trar or not holding the statutory meeting." The winding up provisions
are therefore much broader in scope than the bankruptcy or corporate re-
organization provisions of the United States. In the United States fed-
eral legislation concerns itself with the winding up of companies only when
they are insolvent in the bankruptcy sense or unable to meet their debts
as they mature. In the United States if a company is to be dissolved be-
cause it is terminating business or has failed to comply with its charter
1 2 Halsbury's Statutes of England 878 et seq. (1929), as amended by the Assurance Com-
panies (Winding-Up Acts (I933-35), 23 Geo. 5, c. 9, 25-26 Geo. 5, c. 35 (acts to provide for
winding up of insolvent assurance companies under the Companies Act on petition of the
Board of Trade), govern liquidation; Halsbury, supra at 874-8, govern arrangements and re-
constructions.
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or for other such reasons, the winding up will proceed under the laws of the
sovereign (usually a state) which granted incorporation.
In England "the winding up of a company may be either-
(a) by the court; or
(b) voluntarily; or
(c) subject to the supervision of the court."' 8
If the winding up is either by the court or subject to its supervision, the
High Court has jurisdiction and certain other courts have concurrent ju-
risdiction, as the county court. The Lord Chancellor, with the concurrence
of the President of the Board of Trade, is given authority to make rules for
carrying into effect the provisions for winding up companies in England,
and he, with the sanction of the Treasury, prescribes the fees.
If a tompany is wound up by the court the procedure is analogous to
bankruptcy procedure. There is an official receiver, although he need not
be the official receiver attached to the bankruptcy court, and there is a
liquidator with powers and duties analogous to the trustee in bankruptcy.
A committee of inspection may be appointed and the Board of Trade has
general powers of supervision and investigation. An account known as the
Companies Liquidation Account, and analogous to the Bankruptcy Ac-
count, is kept by the Board of Trade with the Bank of England.
There are two kinds of voluntary winding up: (i) a members' volun-
tary winding up; and (2) a creditors' voluntary winding up. The first kind
applies where the company will be able to pay its debts in full within a
period not exceeding twelve months. Here the proceedings are controlled
by the shareholders. Where the company is not in such a financial state
the proceedings will be controlled by the creditors. In either event the
liquidation is essentially an out-of-court liquidation. Sometimes during
a voluntary winding up the court is asked to assume supervision. If it does
so, the liquidation proceeds in much the same manner as if the winding
up had been by the court from the beginning. A number of detailed pro-
visions of the Act, which are applicable to winding up by the court, do not
apply, however, where the liquidation is merely under its supervision.x9
Many provisions are applicable to every mode of winding up, such as
provisions governing debts provable and priorities, provisions against
fraudulent preferences, and provisions relative to offences occurring prior
to or in the course of the winding up. The latter deal with offences by
officers of the company in complying with the Act, failure to disclose all
of the company's property or produce books, "penalties for falsification
[§ 272]; frauds by officers of the company [§ 273]; liability where proper
n9 See 5 Halsbury's Laws of England 788, 789 (2d ed. 1932).18 Section 156 (3[).
THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEW
books of account have not been kept [§ 274]; responsibility of directors for
fraudulent trading by the company [§ 275]; powers of the court to assess
damages against delinquent directors or other officers [§ 276]; and the pros-
ecution of delinquent directors, officers or members of the company [§
277]. ' '
AR.RANGEMENTS AND RECONSTRUCTIONS
Sections 153 to 155 provide a means for rearranging the capital struc-
ture of a company, the amalgamation of companies, and the transfer of the
assets of one company to a new company. These sections have an ana-
logue in the Canadian Act, 21 and combine features to be found in our fed-
eral reorganization provisiohs and in state provisions for recapitalization
and consolidation of companies. The English sections on arrangements
and reconstructions effect the same objective as the federal and the ap-
plicable state statutes do without the overlapping incident in this coun-
try. Furthermore, insolvency or inability to meet obligations is not a
condition to the invocation of these sections. The company in failing cir-
cumstances may treat with its creditors and if three-fourths in value of
the creditors, or class of creditors, as the case may be, present and voting,
agree, and this agreement is sanctioned by the court, it is binding on all
the creditors, or class of creditors, as the case may be, and upon the com-
pany.
Economic crises have not in themselves produced much change in liq-
uidation legislation in England. The bases of the present Bankruptcy
Act, 1914, are those of 1883; the Deeds of Arrangement Act, 1914, was a
consolidation of the law on that subject, but did mark a formal separation
from bankruptcy; and provisions in the Companies Act, 1929, for liquida-
tion and reorganization of corporations remain substantially as under the
Act of 19o8.
CANADIAN HISTORY AND EXPERIENCE22
BANXRUPTCY
The present Canadian Bankruptcy Act was assented to July 7, I919, to
be effective July 1, 1920. It was based mainly on the English Act of 1883
but did contain provisions taken from other Canadian Legislation, name-
202 Halsbury's Statutes of England 630 (1929).
21See discussion of the Company Creditors' Arrangement Act enacted in Canada in 1933,
page 29 ilfra.
-Citations to the Canadian Act are to the original Statutes of Canada, particularly the Act
of ig9g and its amendments, and not to the Revised Statutes, unless otherwise noted.
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ly, the Insolvent Act of 1875, the Winding-Up Act of i9o6, and various
provincial assignments and preferences acts.23 The Act has been amended
and supplemented almost yearly.24 Nevertheless, as is hereinafter pointed
out, the Act remains basically the same as when enacted. With the ex-
ception of special legislation dealing with farmers, the Canadian Bank-
ruptcy Act is not a product of economic crisis.
In 1867 the British North America Act gave to the Parliament of Can-
ada exclusive legislative authority over "bankruptcy and insolvency. ' '2s
Prior thereto there had been provincial legislation dealing with insolvency.
The provinces had dealt with the matter along English or French lines
depending upon their particular heritage.26 After federation and begin-
ning in 1869 the Dominion had for a time a general bankruptcy law. But
this was repealed in i88o due to unsatisfactory methods of administration
and undue legislative tinkering. Aside from winding-up legislation the
Insolvency Act of 1875, as amended in 1876 and 1877, was the last Domin-
ion Act on the subject of bankruptcy and insolvency until the Act of
19 .J 97
Then for approximately forty years each province in the Dominion
had its own assignment acts. Under these acts the debtor could make an
assignment to an "authorized" trustee who received his appointment from
the provincial governor. The legislation was carried out by such trustees
under creditor supervision in the form of inspectors. A professional class
of trustees grew up which carried on the liquidation business efficiently
and at a reasonable charge to the debtor's estate. Defects in the acts were:
(i) lack of uniformity, the act of each province being different in both
technical and material matters; (2) a debtor could not be compelled to
23 Duncan, Law and Piactice of Bankruptcy in Canada 31, n. 5 (1922).
24 For the original enactment see 9-io Geo. S, c. 36 (i919). For amendments see io-ix
Geo. 5, C. 34 (1920); 11-12 Geo. 5, c. 17 (1921); 12-13 Geo. 5, c. 8 (1922); 13-14 Geo. 5, c. 31
(1923); x5-6 Geo. s, C. 31 (1925); 21-22 Geo. S, c. i7-x8 (1931); 22-23 Geo. 5, c. 39 (1932);
24-25 CGeo. 5, C. 53 (1934); 25-26 Geo. 5, C. 2o, 61 (1935).
25 3-31 Vic., C. 3, § 91 (21) (1867).
Compare Art. I, § 8, cl. 4, of the Constitution of the United States where Congress is given
power only to establish uniform laws on the subject of bankruptcies throughout the United
States. There had been some doubt as to whether this gave Congress power to pass insolvency
legislation; and there had been some attempted distinction in the Canadian provinces be-
tween bankruptcy and insolvency legislation. Arguments have been made that laws which
free the person are insolvent laws and those which discharge contractual obligations are
bankrupt laws; that insolvent laws operate at the instance of the debtor while bankrupt laws
operate at the instance of the creditor, and, it is sometimes said, only against traders. See
Sturges v. Crowinshield, 4 Wheat. (U.S.) 122 (1819). To resolve possible conflict express
authority over "bankruptcy and insolvency" was given by the Act.
26 Duncan, Law and Practice of Bankruptcy in Canada, c. 2 (1922). 27Id. at c. 3.
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make an assignment; (3) a composition or extension could not be made
after an assignment; and (4) discharge provisions were lacking.
Mercantile interests pressed for Dominion legislation. H. P. Grundy,
K.C., of Winnipeg, acting for the Canadian Credit Men's Trust Associa-
tion, was in the main the draftsman of the Act of i919. Mr. Grundy was
familiar with the legislation of other nations, particularly of England and
of the United States, and he drew upon their liquidation experience and
the experience under the early Canadian provincial insolvency laws. The
study of the American Act led him to eschew the American court pro-
cedure and he accordingly eliminated court procedure as a basic principle
of liquidation.2'
The Canadian Act of i919, although amended many times, remains
basically as enacted in 1919. Amendments have been made largely to
clear up ambiguities; to provide a more workable procedure; and to accord
specialized treatment to farmers.
THE INSOLVENT DEBTOR AD HIS CREDITORS
An insolvent is a person "(i) who is for any reason unable to meet his
obligations as they generally become due, or (ii) who has ceased paying his
current obligations in the ordinary course of business as they generally
become due, and (ii) the aggregate of whose property is not, at a fair
valuation, sufficient, or, if disposed of at a fairly conducted sale under
legal process, would not be sufficient to enable payment of all his obliga-
tions, due and accruing due, thereout. ' ' 29 Thus the Canadian definition of
insolvency is far broader than the American bankruptcy definition, since
the latter is limited to the third alternative in the Canadian definition.
Until the Amendment Act of 1922 the acts of bankruptcy, while more nu-
merous, were substantially those of the American Act.30 The Amend-
ment Act of 1922, however, added the following as an act: "if he [a debtor]
ceases to meet his liabilities [generally]3' as they become due. ' '32 This is
wholly foreign to the present American Act.
28 Donovan Report, 71st Cong. 3d Sess. 147 (1931). In connection with the "Donovan"
investigation of bankruptcy conducted for the U.S. District Court for the Southern District
of New York, Robert H. Thayer prepared a "Report of Bankruptcy Administration in
Canada." This report based upon investigation of the working of the Canadian Act is extremely
valuable and the writers have drawn upon it freely. The article by Greenberg, The Bankruptcy
Law in Canada, 5 Jour. Nat. Assn. of Referees irg (193i), has proved helpful.
29 Section 2 (t) as amended.
30 Compare § 3 of the Canadian Act with § 3 of the American Act.
31 The word "generally" did not appear in the Amendment Act of 1922 but was added
by 13-14 Geo. 5, c. 31 § 3 (1923).
,3 12-x3 Geo. 5, c. 8 § 3 (1922). The Amendment Act of 1922 added another act of bank-
ruptcy not particularly material to our discussion.
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The collection features of the English Act are absent. In this respect
the Canadian Act is patterned more nearly after the American Act.
Building societies having a capital stock, incorporated banks, savings
banks, insurance companies, trust companies, loan companies, and rail-
way companies are not subject to the Act.33 Like the American Act a
wage earner or a person engaged solely in farming or the tillage of the soil
is not subject to an involuntary proceeding, although such person may
avail himself of the voluntary provisions.34 Like the American Congress
the Canadian Parliament has seen fit to deal specially with farmers in
other respects. 3S Thus in 1925 the cost to a farmer of a voluntary pro-
ceeding was substantially reduced. A new section, § 8 (c), was added
which provided that if the Lieutenant-Governor in Council of any prov-
ince authorized any officer of the provincial government to act as a cus-
todian and trustee of any person engaged solely in farming or tillage of the
soil, such person should be appointed custodian and trustee and should
not receive any remuneration therefor. Certain costs incurred by that
officer were also to be eliminated. In 1934 the Farmer's Creditors Arrange-
ment Act was passed.36 The Act was apparently a temporary measure de-
signed to tide over farmers during the depression. Its objective and ma-
chinery are very similar to § 75 of the American Bankruptcy Act, which
deals with agricultural compositions and extensions3 7 Unlike the Ameri-
can Act the Canadian Act provides that a farmer may be adjudged a
bankrupt on his failure to carry out an approved proposal, provided that
failure is not due to causes beyond his control35 The board which is set up
to administer the Act has extensive judicial powers, in that it can force
upon both creditors and debtor a proposal which it deems just and proper
in the case.
The Canadian Act is like the English Act in its provision for an allow-
33 Section 2 (k). This is substantially the American provision. ii U.S.C.A., § 22 (1929).
34 Section 8 (i). Cf. § 4, 11 U.S.C.A., § 22 (1929) (American Act.)
is 15-16 Geo. 5, c. 31, § 4 (1925)(1929). Costs of custodian in Part Il of the General Rules
was eliminated.
Section io of the Amendment Act of 1925 also amended § 59 of the Bankruptcy Act
exempting a farmer from the necessity of keeping books of account and allowing him to trade
after knowing himself to be insolvent. Failure to comply with § 59 (b) and (c) by a person
non-exempt is ground for refusing, suspending, or conditioning a discharge in Canada.
36 24-25 Geo. 5, c. 53 (1934)- It was amended by 25-26 Geo. 5, c. 20 and 61 (1935). (Chap-
ter 6i provided that the operation of the Act in British Columbia should cease on proclama-
tion.)
37 Section 75 was added to the American Act in March 3, 1933; amended June 7, i934,
June 28, 1934, August 28, 1935.
39 Section 2 (3).
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ance to the debtor for the support of himself and his family.39 The Ameri-
can method is to allow the debtor such property as would be exempt from
execution under the law of the state of his residence.4° Provisions for the
distribution of the estate are apt to effect a more equitable distribution
than is effected under the American Act. This is true largely because the
Canadian Act, like the English, proceeds on the theory that liquidation
should take place when the debtor becomes unable to meet his obligations
as they mature. Authorized assignments are encouraged, since the stigma
of bankruptcy does not attach to such assignments. At first, title to after-
acquired property in the case of assignments did not vest in the trustee,
while in an involuntary proceeding the trustee took title to such property
until the debtor was discharged.4' This difference of treatment would tend
to encourage debtors in failing circumstances to come forward and treat
with their creditors. It was, however, discontinued in 1923. The trustee
now takes title to after-acquired property in both voluntary and involun-
tary cases.42 Section 48 restricts creditors. It provides that the claims of
certain relatives of the debtor and an officer, director, or share-holder of a
bankrupt corporation shall be postponed until the claims of all other
creditors are satisfied. Provisions governing discharge and offences are
more carefully designed than those in the American Act to safeguard the
financial community against the dishonest and the wastrel. In so far
as they succeed they help to augment the estate to be distributed.
The provisions on the discharge of a bankrupt or assignor43 and on
bankruptcy offences 44 are far more detailed and cover many more matters
than similar provisions in the American Act. Unlike the American Act,
a discharge may be suspended or conditioned when the debtor's assets are
not equal to 5o% of his unsecured liabilities, unless he is able to show that
such condition "has arisen from circumstances for which he cannot justly
be held responsible." Continuation in business after the debtor knows
that he is insolvent is one of many facts which justifies a court in refusing,
suspending, or conditionally granting a discharge. Other such facts are
gambling or rash speculation, extravagance in living, an undue preference,
a former bankruptcy or assignment. The general theory underlying the
provisions governing discharge and criminal offences is to punish the fraud-
ulent and dishonest and to prevent that type of person, as well as the
rash and extravagant person, from again engaging in business as a dis-
charged debtor.
'9 Section 21. Cf. § 58 of the English Act, 1914. 42 13-14 Geo. 5, c. 31 § 15 (1923).
40 Section 6, il U.S.C. § 24. 43 Sections 58, 59, 6o, 6x, 62.
4r Section 25 (a). 44 Part VIII.
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MACIINERY FOR LIQUIDATION
Authorized Assignment. "A great many more liquidations under the
Canadian Act are initiated through authorized assignments than through
involuntary petitions. In the West 95 to 98% of all bankruptcy cases
commence by an authorized assignment. In the East the percentage of
assignments is at least 662% of all cases. When a debtor makes an assign-
ment he is known, not as a 'bankrupt,' but as an authorized assignor, and
to avoid the stigma attached to the word 'bankrupt,' debtors, particularly
in the West, are willing and anxious to effect an assignment voluntarily.
In the large business centers in the East, although this factor does not play
as important a part, yet assignments are preferred and more frequent, be-
cause a debtor who assigns is in a much better position to effect a composi-
tion or extension agreement with his creditors and to retain their good-
will than if the creditors had been compelled to make the initial move
themselves by filing a petition. ' ' 45 Any insolvent debtor, except those cor-
porations not subject to the Act, whose liabilities, provable under the
Act, exceed $500 may make an "authorized assignment." 46 It is essentially
what is known under the American Act as a voluntary petition in bank-
ruptcy, but under the American Act no specified amount of indebtedness
is requisite for a voluntary petition, although a debtor must owe debts to
the amount of $i,ooo before he can be adjudicated an involuntary bank-
rupt.47
The Amending Act of 192141 attempted an anomalous method of liqui-
dation which provided that a debtor could require an authorized trustee
to call a meeting of his creditors to effect a composition, extension, or
scheme of arrangement before the debtor had been adjudicated a bank-
rupt or had made an authorized assignment. Provisions for such settle-
ment were essentially the ordinary composition, extension, or arrange-
ment solutions but apparently it was felt that this was more of an out-of-
court solution and would be more acceptable to debtors and creditors. If
the debtor's proposals were not accepted or confirmed the court might ad-
judge him a bankrupt or permit him to make an authorized assignment.
This method of liquidation was short-lived and was repealed in i923.49
This repeal in 1923 further provided that no composition or extension
agreement could be made until after adjudication or assignment. This
45 Donovan Report, 71st Cong. 3d Sess. 153 (1931).
46 Section 9. 47 Section 4, ii U.S.C.A. § 22 (1929) (American Act).
48 11-12 Geo. 5, c. 17, § 13 (1921). This Act was suggested no doubt by the English Deeds
of Arrangement Act.
49 13-14 Geo. 5, C. 31, § i5 (1923).
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amendment was due to many complaints, particularly from the province
of Quebec, to the effect that "debtors were bribing their creditors and us-
ing fraudulent means to force through compositions to avoid being ad-
judged a bankrupt or an authorized assignor." After the amendment,
compositions decreased in number considerably. They now take place in
only about one-third of all cases.5 0
The discharge provisions apply equally to authorized assignments and
involuntary petitions.
Involuntary Petition. An involuntary petition may be presented by a
creditor or creditors holding provable claims in the amount of $500, pro-
vided it is based on an act of bankruptcy which has occurred within six
months.5' The petition may not be withdrawn after presentation without
leave of the court,52 and the presentation is considered as the commence-
ment of the bankruptcy proceeding.53
Liquidating Officials. An acute problem ever present in liquidation is to
determine whether the liquidation shall be essentially under creditor con-
trol or governmental supervision. Canada has adopted a middle position.
At the first or a subsequent meeting the creditors appoint one or more,
but not exceeding five, inspectors.5 4 Inspectors are usually large creditors,
but sometimes other persons, such as local individuals, may be chosen for
their peculiar knowledge of the estate, or to reduce costs, since inspectors
are entitled to traveling expenses. A trustee must procure the written per-
mission of the inspector for every step that he takes in the liquidation of
the estate. Such permission cannot be general, but is to be a permission
to do a particular thing or things. Inspectors have been compared to a
corporate board of directors, and the trustee, to an executive officer there-
of. When a trustee has procured the requisite permission he is free to act
without court order. As a general rule the inspectors take an active part
in the administration of the estate by the trustee, although if the trustee
is well-known for efficiency and experience in liquidation matters inspec-
tors follow rather than direct the proceedings.55
The original Canadian Act provided for official trustees, individuals or
organizations named by the Governor in Council as competent to liquidate
an estate either under an authorized assignment or an involuntary pro-
ceeding. It was contemplated that the professional trustees which had
functioned under the provincial assignment statutes and had proved
so Donovan Report, 71st Cong. 3d Sess. 156-57 (x931).
5' Section 4 (3). s3 Section 4 (IO) as amended.
S2 Section 4 (9). 54 Section 43.
n Donovan Report, op. cit. supra note 5o at I54-6.
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trustworthy and efficient would be appointed. Official trustee appoint-
ments were used, however, as a means of political patronage and many in-
experienced and incompetent persons were appointed as official trustees.
The Amendment Act of 1923 made rather radical changes in the liquidat-
ing personnel. The office of an Official Receiver was established. There
was to be one such officer in each bankruptcy district or division. He was
to examine the bankrupt or assignor, and he or his nominee was to preside
at the first meeting of creditors. At this meeting the creditors were by
ordinary resolution to choose any person but the Official Receiver as
trustee for the administration of the estate . 6 The return in 1923 to un-
official trustees did not prove entirely satisfactory. It was said in 1931
that "The chief abuse arising from the provisions of the Act itself results
from the existence and operation of fraudulent trustee organizations, who
with the assistance of dishonest debtors are able through the machinery
of the Act to gain control of estates as custodians and later as trustees. 57
The same abuse has occurred under the American Act.s5 The Amendment
Act of 19329 provided that no one could act as a trustee who had not
been licensed by the Minister of Justice. The public interest was to be
considered in issuing the license, which was to be effective for one year,
subject to renewal. From such an official panel creditors may select the
trustee. The office of superintendent of bankruptcy was created; appoint-
ment to be made thereto by the Governor in Council. It is the Superin-
tendent's duty to make reports on trustees, to gather and analyze bank-
ruptcy data, and to make a report relative to the discharge of each debtor
and trustee. Like the English Act the Canadian Act now recognizes that
s
6 The Official Receiver is not to be confused with the receiver under the American Act.
The American receiver corresponds to the Canadian custodian whose duty it is to take
charge of an estate pending the appointment of a trustee. 13-14 Geo. 5, c. 31 (1923). The
Canadian officer who corresponds to the American referee in bankruptcy is the registrar in
bankruptcy. He is a salaried officer of the court appointed in each province by the Chief
Justice of the Supreme Court of that province. "The registrar in bankruptcy often holds
other court offices, such as registrar of other courts, etc., but his functions in bankruptcy
administration are principally judicial. His chief functions .... are to sit in chambers as a
judge and hear all applications of trustees, creditors, or debtors in administrative proceedings
as well as to confirm compositions and grant discharges to both trustees and debtors. (Section
65) is generally interpreted as permittting the registrar to pass upon only those applications
which are unopposed. An appeal from a registrar's holding may always be made to a judge."
Donovan Report, op. cit. supra, note 5o, at 149.
s7 Donovan Report, op. cit. supra note 5o, at 163.
S8 Manipulation and control of the bankruptcy machinery to the interest of non-creditors
were the chief abuses in the Southern District of New York which led to the investigation,
summarized in the "Donovan" Report.
S9 22-23 Geo. 5, c. 39 (1932).
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the public has a vital interest in the proper administration of bankruptcy
legislation and that there must be some public official charged with the
duty to see that the Act functions properly. Creditors alone can not be
expected to see that advantage is not taken by the unscrupulous debtor.
SUMMAY
An investigation into the functioning of the Canadian Bankruptcy Act
revealed that on the whole business men, attorneys, and judges felt that
it was functioning well. 6° The chief abuse discovered then was the fraudu-
lent trustee organization. This abuse, as we have see, has now been cured.
The Canadian Act is neither a debtor's nor a creditors' act. Its aim is
to bring within its provisions an estate as soon as such estate becomes
insolvent; liquidate it under governmental and creditor control; and dis-
charge the honest debtor and protect the community from the dishonest
and inefficient debtor.
LIQUIDATION AND REORGANIZATION OF CORPORATIONS
Corporations, with the exceptions hereinbefore noted, are subject to
provisions of the Bankruptcy Act. No special treatment of corporations
has been accorded in the above discussion of the bankruptcy provisions
because those are designed in the main to effect liquidation, not reorgani-
zation and rehabilitation. The liquidation of a corporation under the
Bankruptcy Act proceeds in the same manner as any bankruptcy pro-
ceeding.
For a considerable time prior to the enactment of the Bankruptcy Act,
Canada had, by its Winding-Up Act, provided for the liquidation of in-
solvent corporations under court supervision.6' Court supervision is the
distinguishing feature between liquidation under the two acts. The Bank-
ruptcy Act did not repeal the Winding-Up Act, but did provide that, for
all corporations subject to the Bankruptcy Act, "the Winding-Up Act
shall not, except by leave of the court, extend or apply to it ..... ,'62 Up
until about 1927 leave of court was freely granted, but about that time a
reaction against granting leave set in.63
The Winding-up Act extends to corporations that are subject to the
Bankruptcy Act, and in addition to such companies as "incorporated
60 Donovan Report, 7st Cong. 3 d Sess. i65-8 (193i).
61 For the Winding-up Act see Rev. Stat. of Canada (1927), C. 213, as amended 20-21 Geo. 5,
c. 49 (1930), 22-23 Geo. s, c. 56 (1932), and as further amended by The Companies' Creditors
Arrangement Act, i933, 23-24 Geo. 5, c. 36 (I933).
62 Rev. Stat. of Canada, c. II, § 153 (1927).
63 Fraser, Reorganization of Companies in Canada, 27 Col. L. Rev. 932, 950 (1927).
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banks, savings banks, incorporated insurance companies, loan companies
having borrowing powers, building societies having a capital stock ..... -64
It "does not apply to building societies which have not a capital stock or to
railway or telegraph companies."
6
,
Practitioners feel that reorganization and rehabilitation cannot be ac-
complished under the Bankruptcy Act, nor in the main under the Wind-
ing-up Act, which like the Bankruptcy Act, aims at liquidation rather than
reorganization. Some reorganizations have occurred, however, under the
Winding-up Act. This takes the form of the organization of a new com-
pany, which purchases the assets of the debtor corporation and issues its
bonds and stock in payment therefor.'
Reorganization by Secured Creditors and Shareholders. Incorporation of
ordinary commercial companies may be either under the Dominion Com-
panies Act or under the Companies Act of a particular province. "If the
company's activities are to be confined to one province, the balance of
convenience is usually in favour of obtaining incorporation in that
province. If the company proposes to carry on business throughout the
Dominion or in several provinces, incorporation under the Dominion Act
is preferable, for the reason that the status and powers of dominion com-
panies cannot be destroyed by provincial legislation ..... The powers of
the company and the rights of the shareholders are, of course, governed by the
particular Companies Act under which the company is incorporated. The
obligations of the company to its creditors and the holders of its securities
are ordinarily governed by the provincial law applicable. This is so, both
for the dominion and provincial companies, because, under the British
North America Act, property and civil rights are within the legislative
jurisdiction of the provinces." 67 But the provincial law yields on the sub-
ject of liquidation. If the Bankruptcy Act or the Winding-up Act is in-
voked, all non-exempt companies, whether dominion or provincial, will be
subject thereto, inasmuch as these Acts deal with bankruptcy and in-
solvency over which the Dominion government has exclusive control.
Thus the place of incorporation is important if a recapitalization by
shareholders is solely involved, otherwise not.
If the company is not being liquidated, the particular Companies Act,
under which incorporation took place, is applicable and will govern a re-
capitalization by shareholders. Both the Dominion Companies Act and
64 Rev. Stat. of Canada, c. 213, § 6 (1927).
6s Rev. Stat. of Canada, C. 213, § 7 (i927).
"See Fraser, op. cit. supra note 63 at 950. 67Id. at 932. (Italics ours.)
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the provincial Companies Acts provide means whereby a specified major-
ity of the shareholders may effect a readjustment of their rights.68
If proceedings are initiated by or against a corporation, under the
Bankruptcy Act, Section I3, as amended in 1923, permits the bankruptcy
court to adjust and modify the rights of shareholders. 69
Before the reorganization of a company, as opposed to liquidation, can
be understood the standard provisions of the Canadian corporate mort-
gage must be described. It contains two provisions not commonly found in
American mortgages: (i) a floating charge provision; and (2) majority
provisions, whereby a stated majority of the bondholders may affect
their rights and the rights of the minority bondholders."0
These features are similar to those commonly inserted in English trust
deeds. The floating charge gives the bondholders an immediate equitable
charge upon the corporate property, present and future, subject to the
right of the corporation to deal with its property in the ordinary course
of business. The company is quite generally given power to effect ordinary
commercial loans with priority over the equitable charge. When default
under the mortgage has occurred the floating charge becomes crystallized
upon the corporate property. As a consequence unsecured creditors can
gain little by the initiation of liquidation proceedings; the trustee in
bankruptcy or the liquidator under the Winding-up Act would take the
property subject to this all-inclusive and paramount floating charge.
The majority provisions give a stated percentage of bondholders the
right to take effective action and bind themselves and the minority bond-
'holders. Such provisions commonly found in Canadian mortgages give
the majority the power, by extraordinary resolution, to effect a plan of re-
organization and such other powers as are commonly given, not by the
American corporate mortgage but by American bondholders, to com-
mittees formed to represent them in reorganization proceedings.
If no thoroughgoing reorganization is necessary, but only partial re-
68 For the Dominion Companies Act see Rev. Stat. of Canada, C. 27, §§ 144, 145 (1927),
as amended by 20-21 Geo. 5, c. 9, § 37 (1930), 24-25 Geo. 5, C. 33, §§ 122, 123 (1934). (Three-
fourths of the shareholders or class of shareholders, as the case may be, present and voting at
the meeting called therefor may, subject to approval by the court, make a binding compro-
mise or arrangement concerning the status of such class.)
69 9-IO Geo. 5, c. 37, § 13 (igg), as amended by 13-14 Geo. 5, C. 31, § i (1923); Rev. Stat.
of Can., c. ii, § 21 (1927).
7o For treatment of the Canadian corporate mortgage, a form of floating charge, and a good
discussion thereof, as well as discussion of majority provisions, see Fraser, Reorganization of
Companies in Canada, 27 Col. L. Rev. 932, 934 et seq. (1927), on whom the writers have drawn
freely for Canadian corporate reorganization materials.
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organization, a specified number of bondholders may accomplish this by
requiring the trustee to call a meeting, and voting at that meeting to make
certain modifications in their rights."'
If extensive scaling down of fixed charges and the obtaining of new
capital is necessary, reorganization will normally be effected by judicial
sale. The trustee will initiate foreclosure proceedings. A receiver and
manager (who is the same person) will be appointed to take charge of and
manage all the property comprised in the mortgage which will, by virtue
of the floating charge, be all of the corporate property. Bondholder's com-
mittees will be formed and deposits solicited. The formality of public
sale will be gone through with, but if the bondholders' committee has been
successful in securing deposits there will be no one to bid against it. Un-
like the American bondholders' committee it will not put in a bid but will
take steps to effect its plan of reorganization. Since a stated majority may
bind the minority no cash is needed to buy off dissenters and the plan can
then be put into effect. In some of the provinces it was necessary to secure
the court's approval of the plan as well as the master's confirmation if a
cash transaction was not involved. 72
No revolutionary legislative changes have been made. The Com-
panies' Creditors Arrangement Act was passed in i933,73 and the Domin-
ion Companies Act was amended in I934-74
The Arrangement Act applies to all corporations, "except banks, rail-
way or telegraph companies, insurance companies and trust companies
organized under or governed by the Trust Companies Act, and loan com-
panies organized under or governed by the Loan Companies Act."' 7s The
purpose of the Arrangement Act was to facilitate compromises and ar-
rangements between companies, both provincial and dominion, and their
creditors. The Canadian corporate mortgage features are not limited by
the Arrangement Act, but it is in extension of their rights.76 The necessity
7' "Instances of modifications effected by the above procedure are the postponement or re-
duction of sinking fund requirements; the extension of the maturity of the bonds either with
or without terms as to increasing the interest rate where market conditions or the company's
position make immediate refunding operations undesirable or impossible; permission to the
company to purchase property subject to lien ranking ahead of the bonds; permission to the
company to sell the assets to a new company subject to the existing bond mortgage; release of
the mortgaged assets in exchange for new securities; authorization to the trustee to release
part of the mortgaged premises either on terms or unconditionally; waiver of minor de-
faults." Fraser, op. cit. supra note 70 at 944.
72 Id. at 942.
73 23-24 Geo. 5, c. 36 (1933). 75 See § 2 (b).
74 24-25 Geo. 5, c. 33, §§ 122, 123, 124 (1934). 76 See § 7.
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for a judicial sale, however, is dispensed with. But action by bondholders
and other creditors is subject to court control.
The purpose of the amendment to the Dominion Companies Act was
further to facilitate compromises and arrangements between dominion
companies and shareholders.
The processes of corporate liquidation and reorganization have been
brought under increased court supervision, but aside from that they seem
to ha' e remained essentially the same.
SUMLARY
Canadian methods of reorganization prior to the economic crisis were
not essentially different from those of the United States.77 The chief
difference was due to the power of the majority of Canadian bondholders
to bind the minority and their control over the assets of the corporation
by virtue of the floating charge. That is a more extensive power than
bondholders have in America, although, after the reorganization proceed-
ing commences, their committees obtain, by solicitation and deposit, an
extensive and direct power over depositors, and a large bargaining power
with non-depositors. That difference still distinguishes present reorganiza-
tion proceedings in Canada and the United States. In both countries
there has been a trend toward more court supervision and control.
It is difficult to tell (i) whether the bondholders in Canada have abused
their extensive power over corporate assets; and (2) whether they have
been imposed upon by their committees. A distinguished commentator
took the position in 1927 that neither abuse seemed present.75 Since there
is more court supervision today the danger of abuse seems further mini-
mized, but there is no machinery governing bondholders' committees. As
subsequently pointed out in the discussion of American reorganization,
bondholders' committees have abused their power in this country. Legis-
lation is pending to correct such abuses.7 9 Whether it is needed in Canada
today is not yet apparent.
77 Cf. Swaine, Reorganization of Corporations, Certain Developments of the Last Decade,
27 Col. L. Rev. goi (1927) an article companionate to Fraser's, op. cit. supra n. 70 which deals
with American reorganization; see also this paper, infra, dealing with American corporate
reorganization and liquidation.
78 See Fraser, op. cit. supra note 70.
79 Representative Lea has introduced the "Committee Act of 1937," H.R. 6968, 75th Cong.
xst Sess. (1937), designed to regulate the solicitation of proxies, deposits, and assents in con-
nection with reorganizations, voluntary readjustment and debt arrangements, and to prevent
committees from overreaching those whom they purport to represent in the reorganization
proceeding.
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AMERICAN HISTORY AND EXPERIENCE
Article I, § 8, cl. 4, of the Constitution gives Congress the power "to
establish a uniform Rule of Naturalization, and uniform Laws on the sub-
ject of bankruptcies throughout the United States." Nowhere in our
fundamental law is the "Subject of Bankruptcies" defined.
The Articles of Confederation had contained no mention of power in the
central government to regulate commercial practices among the states.
The lack of commercial unity among the states and the inability of the
Federal Confederate Government to deal properly with interstate com-
mercial practices was a motivating force toward the establishment of a
stronger Federal Government. The state insolvency laws had proved in-
adequate, and were important causes contributing to the disunity of the
mercantile structure. There were delegates to the Constitutional Con-
vention in 1787 who were familiar with the English bankruptcy legislation
and its method of operation, and with the various colonial laws on the
subject. But their abilities were not drawn on until a late date in the Con-
stitutional Convention, when the matter of federal control of bankrupts
first came up. Charles Pinckney was the author of the first draft of the
bankruptcy clause. It read that Congress should have power "to estab-
lish uniform laws on the subject of bankruptcies and respecting the dam-
ages arising on the protest of foreign bills of exchange." The subject was
then regarded as it had been in England for over two hundred years and
during the middle ages on the Continent, as a regulation of commerce
which, if not a part of the law merchant, was closely related thereto.
Madison was shortly to comment: "The power of establishing uniform
laws of bankruptcy is so intimately connected with the regulation of com-
merce and will prevent so many frauds where the parties or their property
may lie or be removed into the different States, that the expediency of it
seems not likely to be drawn into question."8 The promotion of com-
merce by a wise use of the bankruptcy power in protecting credit relations
is evident.' It, therefore, becomes important to note that the grant of the
bankruptcy power in its final form, although related to commerce, was
not included in clause 3, which gives to Congress the power "to regulate
Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with
the Indian Tribes." From that it is fair to infer that the draftsmen did
not wish to restrict the bankruptcy grant as they had done the power over
commerce. Congress was to have an all inclusive power, through the
80 The Federalist no. 42; and see Senate Doc. no. 65, 72d Cong. ist Sess. 50 (x932).
81 See supra note i.
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bankruptcy grant, to enact any legislation reasonablyframed and related to
the subject of bankruptcies, which in turn is indissolubly linked to com-
merce and credit. The United States Supreme Court, by a long line of
decisions, has affirmed the power. Only in its 5-4 decision holding the
Municipal-Debt Readjustments Act unconstitutional as an infringement
of state sovereignty has it definitely limited the power: a decision legally
and economically indefensible.12
If, in addition, it is remembered that the first English Acts, as well as
the early American Acts, were designed for the protection of the com-
mercial community; that insolvency was not an element in those laws,
although that element has been drawn into the modern legislation, it can
be seen that the Constitutional grant of power over the subject of bank-
ruptcies embraces the entire field of debtor-creditor relationships for the
purpose of equitable distribution of a debtor's estate, rehabilitation of the
debtor, and protection of the credit structure against anything materially
contributing toward its impairment.8 3 judge, later justice, Blatchford,
commented: "It cannot be doubted that Congress in passing laws on the
subject of bankruptcy is not restricted to laws with such scope only as the
English laws had when the Constitution was adopted. The power given
must, indeed, be held to be general, unlimited, and unrestricted over the
sub ject."5 4
THE ACTS OF 18oo, 1841, 1867
Story thought the colonies and states never had any laws that could
technically be called bankruptcy laws. Pennsylvania, however, had
82 The decision is Ashton v. Cameron Co. Water Imp. Dist. No. r, 31 Am. B. R. (N.S.) 96,
56 S.Ct. 892 (1936), criticized by the writers in the revision of Gilbert's Collier on Bankruptcy
,555-7 (4th ed. 1937). In speaking of the bankruptcy power Mr. Justice Cardozo in the
Ashton case said: "The history is one of an expanding concept. It is, however, an expanding
concept that has had to fight its way. Almost every change has been hotly denounced in its
beginnings as a usurpation of power. Only time or judicial decision has had capacity to
silence opposition." Warren, writing a short time before the Ashton case, commented in this
manner on the power: ".... until the decision on May 27, 1935, in the Frazier-Lemke Act
case, no development under the Bankruptcy Clause of the Constitution has ever failed of sup-
port by the Supreme Court." Warren, Bankruptcy in the United States History 9-1o (i935).
The Frazier-Lemke Act decision to which he refers held invalid one subsection of Section 75,
which deals with Agricultural Compositions and Extensions, on the ground that it was not
reasonably framed, and thus deprived the secured creditor of property without due process of
law. Since that decision the subsection was amended and has been sustained as constitutional
by the United States Supreme Court. Wright v. Vinton Branch of Mountain Trust Bank of
Roanoke, Va., 57 S. Ct. 556 (I937). The problem is discussed in Constitutional Law-Due
Process and the Frazier-Lemke Acts, 35 Mich. L. Rev. ix3o (1937). For the new municipal
bankruptcy act see Public Act no. 302, 7 5th Cong. ist Sess. (1937).
83 Cf. Kreft, What Is the "Subject of Bankruptcies?", 6 Temp. L. Q. 141 (1932).
S4 In re Reiman, Fed. Cas. No. 11673 (1874).
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passed "An Act for the Regulation of Bankruptcies" in 1785. In addition,
Pennsylvania, like most of the other states, had insolvency laws. These
laws were not uniform; nor did they furnish adequate coverage. In some
states, such as Massachusetts and Connecticut, for instance, the in-
solvency laws dealt only with a deceased debtor's estate. The main in-
adequacy of the state insolvency laws, however, was the inability to give
a discharge which would be effective in other states.
At the beginning of our national history, speculation in government
scrip, in the shares of new corporations, in land, and the large commercial
losses due to our relations with France produced such financial stringency
that some national legislation became necessary. The Act of 18oo was the
answer. It closely resembled the English and Pennsylvania statutes. It
was a temporary measure expressly limited to five years and was repealed
in 18o3. It contained no voluntary provisions and applied only to traders,
merchants, and brokers. The acts of bankruptcy were those by which a
debtor attempted to put himself or his property beyond the reach of his
creditors. Insolvency was not an element of an act of bankruptcy. The
bankrupt was given a certain percentage of his assets, provided the estate
paid certain specified percentages to the creditors. In addition the com-
missioners in bankruptcy could make such allowances to him as was
necessary for the support of himself and family. The honest debtor who
complied with the provisions of the Act was entitled to a discharge after
the commissioners had certified to his compliance, provided two-thirds in
number and in value of the bankrupt's creditors (creditors for less than
fifty dollars were not counted) signed or consented to the allowance of the
discharge. Thus the first American law dealt with discharge as the Eng-
lish had done under the practice as developed under the law of 1705.
Dissatisfaction with the Act was due to the difficulty of travel to the
more or less remote and unpopular federal courts; to the small dividends
that had been paid, although little more could be expected since most of
the debtors proceeded against were already in jail; and because some un-
scrupulous debtors had been able to use the Act to their advantage. Then,
too, the agricultural classes had been opposed to bankruptcy legislation
from the first. With the return of prosperity, the agricultural opposition
and the dissatisfaction with the working of the Act combined to effect a
repeal.
There was agitation from time to time for the enactment of a new
bankruptcy law. "In 1824, for example, Daniel Webster introduced and
strongly supported a bill for a bankruptcy law designed to supplant the
'twenty-four different and dashing systems' of the States. President
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Adams recommended the passage of a law in 182 5 ."'8S But the next legisla-
tion did not come until 1841. Under the Act of 1841, involuntary proceed-
ings were limited to cases where the debtor put himself or his property
beyond the reach of his creditors. Voluntary proceedings, however, were
open to all debtors. This was attacked as unconstitutional on the ground
that a law which permitted voluntary proceedings was not a bankruptcy
but an insolvency law,"6 but voluntary proceedings have come to be re-
garded as an essential part of our Act. Any debtor who surrendered his
property and complied with the orders of the court could obtain a dis-
charge. Creditor control was eliminated. Unlike the Act of 18oo which
provided for the election of a trustee by creditors, the Act of 1841 did not
provide for meetings of creditors but did provide that the court would ap-
point a trustee. The Act of 1841 was largely a product of financial strin-
gency, and like the Act of i8oo was short-lived. It was repealed in 1843.
Its chief contribution to the legislation which we now have was its pro-
visions for discharge and voluntary proceedings.
Financial stress produced by the Civil War brought on the enactment
of legislation in 1867. As we noted, the Act of 1841 abolished distinctions
between traders and other persons so far as voluntary proceedings were
concerned. The Act of 1867 went further and abolished the distinction en-
tirely. Voluntary proceedings were limited to debtors owing at least three
hundred dollars and no voluntary bankrupt could be granted a second dis-
charge unless in the second proceeding dividends of at least seventy per-
cent were paid or three-fourths in value of the creditors assented to a
lesser amount. The consent of creditors was required for a discharge where
the estate paid less than fifty percent, unless a stated majority in number
and value of his creditors assented to a smaller dividend. Subsequently in
1874 the fifty percent dividend requirement for discharge was abolished
in involuntary proceedings, and only a thirty percent dividend or the
consent of one-fourth the creditors holding one-third in amount of the
claims was required in voluntary proceedings. Composition provisions
were also added. A debtor could effect a composition without being ad-
judicated a bankrupt. Here we have the first escape in American legisla-
tion from the stigma attaching to bankruptcy.
One of the most important features was the provision that the failure
to pay commercial paper for a period of fourteen days 7 by a banker,
merchant, or trader was an act of bankruptcy for the purpose of involun-
tary proceedings.
8s Senate Doc. No. 65, 72nd Cong. ist Sess. 51 n. 6 (1932).
861d. at Si. 87 In 1874 the time was extended to forty days.
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Repeal was partly due to some abuses on the part of courts in appoint-
ing trustees in addition to the trustee or trustees elected by the creditors;
but numerous and excessive fees were the main causes. It was effected in
1878 by majorities in the Senate and the House of six to one and five to
one, respectively.
THE ACT OF 18988s
While measures for repeal of the Act of 1867 were pending many people
realized that a national bankruptcy law was needed. Although they were
not strong enough to prevent the repeal they immediately began agitation
for new legislation. The Boston Merchants Association obtained Judge
Lowell of Massachusetts in 1881 to draft a bill. He sought to protect
credit by provisions along English lines. The offences enumerated and
the grounds for discharge were substantially those now forming a part of
the English and Canadian laws. Creditor consent to a discharge was
eliminated. In this feature he anticipated English legislation of 1883.
His most important changes over the Act of 1867 were in the ad-
ministrative provisions that had given rise to so much objection. The
fee system for referees was to be abolished; referees were to receive salaries
of two thousand dollars and allowances for their expenses. He followed
the English law by providing that creditors should appoint a committee
to advise and supervise the trustee, who under such supervision was given
a free hand in administration. 9 He further provided that in each circuit,
judges should appoint a supervisor in bankruptcy. His duties would be to
examine into the administration of bankruptcy proceedings, to advise the
referees and trustees in administrative matters, to report to the courts any
misconduct on the part of trustees and to make quarterly reports to the
circuit courts covering the entire field of administration. Here, too, he
anticipated the English Act of 1883 which established a board of trade
with comparable duties, and the Canadian Amendment Act of 1932 which
created the office of superintendent of bankruptcy.
The Lowell Bill introduced into Congress in 1881 was opposed by cer-
tain classes which felt that their interests would be subserved by no
bankruptcy legislation and by those who felt that legislation was needed
but that the Lowell Bill was not the proper remedy. Senator Ingalls of
Kansas sponsored a substitute bill known as the Equity Bill. Creditor
88 The writers have drawn extensively for the historical material on The Report of the
Attorney General on Bankruptcy Law and Practice, 72nd Cong. ist Sess. Sen. Doc. No. 65,
58 et se. (1932).
89 The Act of 1867 had similar provisions with certain limitations. They never seem to have
been used.
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control was to be entirely eliminated; proceedings were to be in the dis-
trict courts sitting in equity and subject to such rules as they should
develop. His bill had one important effect upon the Act of 1898. It con-
tained, for the first time in the history of bankruptcy legislation, the
definition of insolvency as an insufficiency of assets at a fair valuation to
meet the debtor's liabilities. This definition was bitterly attacked by
Senator Hoar:
"The Lowell bill adopts the only definition of bankruptcy which is practicable and
which has proved itself to the experience of mankind, and that is the inability to pay
debts in the course of business. The committee's bill, on the other hand, provides that
the man is only to be deemed insolvent, to be a subject of bankruptcy jurisdiction,
when the entire value of his property, whether it is capable of being realized within i
year or within io years, exceeds the amount of his indebtedness.
Consider, in the first place, how impossible of practical ascertainment is the fact
you propose as your test. You require at the threshold of every application in bank-
ruptcy that the court shall go into an investigation of the value of every debt, bad
debt or good debt, the value of every interest, contingent or absolute, in property,
the value of all expectations of every sort which are the property of the debtor, *""g
Because of the opposition which the Lowell Bill was facing, various
commercial interests secured Colonel Torrey, an attorney of St. Louis, to
draft a new bill. In general he followed the substance of the Lowell Bill.
The arrangement, chapter headings, and most of the phraseology of the
Act of c898, however, were Colonel Torrey's. His chief omissions were:
(i) elimination of the supervisor in bankruptcy; (2) displacement of pro-
visions for creditors' committees by the requirement that the trustee
should collect, liquidate, and distribute the estate under the directions of
the court. New features which he added were: (i) that the United States
Attorney, when directed by the judge on a creditor's application, should
attend the first meeting of creditors and publicly examine the bankrupt,
and attend a hearing on the bankrupt's discharge and oppose it unless
satisfied from the bankrupt's examination that there were no grounds
therefor; and (2) that in every case the court should publicly examine the
bankrupt. By these new features the public interest was to be protected
as under the English Act of 1883, but without setting up new machinery.
In 1894 Representative Baily of Texas introduced a bill of a temporary
character and one that was not well worked out. It did, however, contain
an interesting suggestion. The administration was to be through assign-
ments under the state laws, the debtor applying to the federal court only
for his discharge. This notion deserves consideration today. It might be
made the basis for summary bankruptcy in this country: that is, liquida-
9' Sen. Doc. No. 65, op. cit. stepra note 88 at 6o, 6i.
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tion of small estates, say of $i,ooo assets, might be left to the state as-
signment laws, subject to some supervision by the federal bankruptcy
courts, while estates with greater assets could be administered in federal
courts from the outset.
In 1898, however, Congress enacted the Torrey Bill, modified by several
judiciary committees of the House and the influence of various substitute
bills. The Torrey Bill was signed by President McKinley on July 1, 1898.
There have been a number of efforts made to repeal the Act, largely by
those who feel that bankruptcy accompanied by discharge has been made
too easy for the fraudulent and the wastrel debtor.92
Prior to the last economic crisis the Act was amended in 1903, 19o6,
191O, 1911, 1915, 1916, 1917, 1922, 1925, and 1926.92 These amendments
have not altered the basic features of the Act of 1898. The acts of bank-
ruptcy, the discharge, and the criminal provisions have been strengthened
to some extent. The acts of bankruptcy are: (i) fraudulent transfer, (2)
preferential transfer, (3) and (4) preference through legal proceedings, (5)
general assignment for the benefit of creditors or a receivership, and (6)
written confession of bankruptcy. Insolvency is not an element of acts
(1), (6), and so much of (5) as deals with a general assignment, but sol-
vency at date of petition is a defense to a proceeding based on act (1).
These acts are substantially those of the Canadian Act as it stood until
amended in 1922, when it was there provided that it was an act of bank-
ruptcy for a debtor to fail to meet his liabilities as they become due. Pro-
ceedings under the American Act must be begun within four months after
the commission of the act. Provisions as to who may become bankrupts
are analogous to the Canadian provisions. "Any person, except a munici-
pal, railroad, insurance, banking corporation, or a building and loan as-
sociation" may become a voluntary bankrupt. Under this provision, un-
like the Canadian Act, no specific amount of liabilities is required. "Any
natural person, except a wage earner or farmer, any unincorporated com-
pany, and any moneyed, business, or commercial corporation (except a
municipal, railroad, insurance or banking corporation, or a building and
loan association) owing debts to the amount of $iooo or over, may be ad-
judged an involuntary bankrupt ..... -93 Insolvency as an element of
bankruptcy, we have noted, is the excess of liabilities over assets at a fair
valuation.
9Id. at 64.
92For detailed analysis of the Act of 1898 including amendments listed in text and the
amendments of 1932, 1933, 1934, 1935, and 1936 see the writers' revision of Gilbert's Collier on
Bankruptcy (4th ed. z937).
93 Section 4, i U.S.C. § 22 (1929).
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The administration of the estate is conducted by the federal courts of
bankruptcy, largely through referees. In theory, trustees are to be selected
by creditors, appointed by the referee, but thereafter subject to the direc-
tions of the court. An investigation into the bankruptcy practice in the
Southern District of New York, which embraces the metropolitan area
of New York City, has shown rather conclusively that creditor control is
apt to be only a myth in practice94 To meet the abuses which had arisen
there the judges of the Southern District of New York appointed a
reputable bank as standing receiver and made it practicable for that bank
to be chosen as trustee unless the creditors actually desired another. But
by Act of June 7, 1934, Congress, apparently because of political reasons,
provided that the court must apportion the appointment of receivers and
trustees to prevent a person from having a monopoly of such appoint-
ments.95 Bankruptcy administration remains subject to abuse by the
solicitation of proxies and the resulting control of the proceeding by those
not vitally interested in its administration. Creditor control has broken
down in this country.
Procedure for supervision by appeal is not dearly defined and hence is
wasteful. This is due to the theoretical distinction between (3) contro-
versies arising in bankruptcy, supposedly between the estate and third
persons, and (2) administrative proceedings in bankruptcy which sup-
posedly affect only those actually parties to the procedure.
The trustee takes title as of the date the petition is filed. The bank-
rupt's after-acquired property is not subject to the proceeding. The
criminal provisions and the grounds for which a discharge may be refused
are less numerous than those in the English and Canadian Acts and are
not so apt to protect the commercial community.
In his message to Congress in 1932 President Hoover tersely pointed
out the importance of adequate bankruptcy legislation to the business
community and the course which legislation should take:
"The number of cases in bankruptcy has steadily increased from 23,000 in the fiscal
year 1921 to 53,000 in 1928 and to 65,ooo in 3931. The liabilities involved have in-
creased from $171,000,000 in 1921 to $83o,ooo,ooo in'1929 and to $i,oo8,ooo,ooo in
1931, and the losses to creditors have increased from $i44,ooo,ooo, in 1921 to $740,-
ooo,ooo in 1928 and to $gii,ooo,ooo in 1931. The increases are therefore obviously
not due to the economic situation, but to deeper causes.
A sound bankruptcy system should operate-
First, to relieve honest but unfortunate debtors of an overwhelming burden of debt;
94 See Donovan Report, 71st Cong. 3rd Sess. (i93i).
95 1, U.S.C. § 76a (1929).
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Second, to effect a prompt and economical liquidation and distribution of insolvent
estates; and
Third, to discourage fraud and needless waste of assets by withholding relief from
debtors in proper cases .....
The present bankruptcy act is defective in that it holds out every inducement for
waste of assets long after business failure has become inevitable. It permits exploita-
tion of its own process and wasteful administration by those who are neither truly
representative of the creditor nor the bankrupt.
Except in rare cases it results in the grant of a full discharge of all debts without
sufficient inquiry as to the conduct of the bankrupt or of the causes of failure. It dis-
charges from their debts large numbers of persons who might have paid without hard-
ship had the law discriminated between those overwhelmed by misfortune and those
needing only temporary relief and the opportunity to deal fairly with creditors.
The bankruptcy act should be amended to provide remedial processes in voluntary
proceedings under which debtors, unable to pay their debts in due course, may have
the protection of the court without being adjudged bankrupt, for the purpose of com-
posing or extending the maturity of their debts, of amortizing the payment of their
debts out of future earnings, of procuring the liquidation of their property under volun-
tary assignment to a trustee; or, in the case of corporations, for the purpose of re-
organization.
The act should be amended to require the examination of every bankrupt by a re-
sponsible official and a full disclosure of the cause of his failure and of his conduct in
connection therewith for the consideration of the court in determining whether he
should have his discharge.
The discretion of the courts in granting or refusing discharge should be broadened,
and they should be authorized to postpone discharges for a time and require bankrupts,
during the period of suspension, to make some satisfaction out of after-acquired prop-
erty as a condition to the granting of a full discharge.
The choice of the liquidating personnel should be limited to competent individuals
or organizations after careful consideration by the courts of their qualifications and
ability to maintain an efficient and permanent staff for the conduct of the business.
Compensation for such services should be upon a scale which will attract trained busi-
ness organizations. Competent officials should be continuously charged with the ob-
servance of the administration of the law and charged with the duty to suggest to the
courts and to Congress methods for its improvement. The present statute is sus-
ceptible of improvement to eliminate delay in its cumbersome processes, much of which
results from a confusion of judicial and business functions."96
It can be seen that his recommendations are along English lines. The
New Deal bankruptcy legislation has only proceeded in part along Eng-
lish lines. Liquidation thereunder is largely under court supervision. The
new sections on compositions and extensions, reorganization of railroads
engaging in interstate commerce, corporate reorganizations, aind munici-
pal debt readjustments97 did, however, attempt to take over and conserve
9 Sen. Doc. No. 65, p. xi, xii (1932).
97 The municipal debt readjustment provisions have been declared unconstitutional, but
new legislation has been enacted. See note 82 supra.
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the estates before they had become insolvent in the American bankruptcy
sense. To this extent and to the extent that they provided new machinery
that was much needed for liquidation they have been an improvement.
Legislation is now pending in Congress to revise and integrate the
Bankruptcy Act of 1898 as amended through 1936.98 The draftsmanship of
the proposed legislation is clearly an improvement. That legislation at-
tempts to prevent some of the abuses which have occurred under "strict
bankruptcy," in corporate reorganizations, and in compositions and ex-
tensions. But it fails to provide necessary protection to the credit struc-
ture in dealing with the non-voluntary, non-corporate debtor, inasmuch as
it clings to the notion that insolvency means excess of liabilities over
assets as a fair valuation. An understanding of the defect of pending
legislation, however, is impossible without an understanding of the meth-
od of arrangements existing in this country prior to the depression and the
changes in the method of arrangements wrought during the depression.T
98 This bankruptcy legislation popularly known as the Chandler Bill, because it has been
so ably championed by Congressman Walter Chandler, was first introduced on May 28, 1936,
as H.R. 12889, reintroduced on April 15, 1937, as H.R. 6439, and again on July 28, 1937, as
H.R. 8046. It represents the careful and considered work of several years. It has passed the
House and if finally enacted will represent a distinct improvement. Representative Lea has
also introduced the Committee Act, H.R. 6968, and Senator Barkley has introduced the Trust
Indenture Act, S. 2344, measures which in one form or another are necessary for the improve-
ment of reorganization practice. The Chandler, Lea and Barkley bills are examined in the
subsequent article. While the writers will have some criticism of these measures, it is not to
be doubted that, if properly integrated and revised in some particulars, they represent a for-
ward step of great importance.
t The changes in reorganization practice in the United States and proposed federal legisla-
tion will be dealt with in a second article to be printed in the next issue of this Review.
